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Abstract
This article was prepared as part of a recent symposium celebrating the Nineti-
eth Anniversary of the founding of the Federal Trade Commission. In addition,
fall 2004 marks the Thirtieth Anniversary of a pivotal moment in the establish-
ment of the modern advocacy program at the FTC, Chairman Lewis Engman’s
speech on the economic burden that inefficient transportation regulation policies
were imposing on the American economy. Although the FTC has been involved in
advocacy activities since its founding, Engman’s speech symbolized a new aggres-
siveness on the part of the FTC in using its expertise to work with other govern-
mental actors at all levels of the political system and in all branches of government
to design policies that further competition and consumer choice.
Notwithstanding the beneficial impact that advocacy activities have had on the
economy, the fortunes of the advocacy program have waxed and waned over time.
In part, these mixed fortunes may reflect a lack of fundamental grounding of advo-
cacy within the core mission of the FTC. The advocacy program, moreover, often
has been politically controversial, exposing the Commission to criticism from spe-
cial interests, Congress, and other governmental actors.
This article explores the theory and practice of competition advocacy, with the
goal of explaining why the advocacy program should be recognized as a core el-
ement of the Commission’s mission. Advocacy can be used in conjunction with
many of the FTC’s other tools, and in many situations the judicious use of ad-
vocacy can provide a low-cost and effective alternative to other enforcement op-
tions. The advocacy program is a unique and cost-effective tool for carrying out
this mission. Because consumers are disadvantaged in the political arena vis-a-vis
industry, they are likely to be unable to stop anticompetitive regulation on their
own. Antitrust immunities, moreover, sometimes put anticompetitive regulation
beyond the reach of traditional enforcement. By providing a means for the FTC
to represent consumers’ interests directly in the policy-production mechanism,
the advocacy program can overcome these two hurdles and provide protection for
consumers at relatively low cost.
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ABSTRACT 
This article was prepared as part of a recent symposium celebrating the Ninetieth 
Anniversary of the founding of the Federal Trade Commission.  In addition, fall 2004 marks the 
Thirtieth Anniversary of a pivotal moment in the establishment of the modern advocacy program at 
the FTC, Chairman Lewis Engman’s speech on the economic burden that inefficient transportation 
regulation policies were imposing on the American economy.  Although the FTC has been involved 
in advocacy activities since its founding, Engman’s speech symbolized a new aggressiveness on the 
part of the FTC in using its expertise to work with other governmental actors at all levels of the 
political system and in all branches of government to design policies that further competition and 
consumer choice.   
Notwithstanding the beneficial impact that advocacy activities have had on the economy, the 
fortunes of the advocacy program have waxed and waned over time.  In part, these mixed fortunes 
may reflect a lack of fundamental grounding of advocacy within the core mission of the FTC.  The 
advocacy program, moreover, often has been politically controversial, exposing the Commission to 
criticism from special interests, Congress, and other governmental actors.  
 This article explores the theory and practice of competition advocacy, with the goal of 
explaining why the advocacy program should be recognized as a core element of the Commission’s 
mission.  Advocacy can be used in conjunction with many of the FTC’s other tools, and in many 
situations the judicious use of advocacy can provide a low-cost and effective alternative to other 
enforcement options.  The advocacy program is a unique and cost-effective tool for carrying out this 
mission.  Because consumers are disadvantaged in the political arena vis-a-vis industry, they are 
likely to be unable to stop anticompetitive regulation on their own.  Antitrust immunities, moreover, 
sometimes put anticompetitive regulation beyond the reach of traditional enforcement.  By providing 
a means for the FTC to represent consumers’ interests directly in the policy-production mechanism, 
the advocacy program can overcome these two hurdles and provide protection for consumers at 
relatively low cost. 
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I. Introduction        
This fall marks the Thirtieth Anniversary of a pivotal moment in the establishment of the 
modern advocacy program at the FTC, Chairman Lewis Engman’s speech on the economic 
burden that inefficient transportation regulation policies were imposing on the American 
economy.1  Although the FTC has been involved in advocacy activities since its founding,2 
Engman’s speech symbolized a new aggressiveness on the part of the FTC in using its expertise 
to work with other governmental actors at all levels of the political system and in all branches of 
government to design policies that further competition and consumer choice.   
Notwithstanding the beneficial impact that advocacy activities have had on the economy, 
the fortunes of the advocacy program have waxed and waned over time.  In part, these mixed 
fortunes may reflect a lack of fundamental grounding of advocacy within the core mission of the 
FTC.  The advocacy program, moreover, often has been politically controversial, exposing the 
Commission to criticism from special interests, Congress, and other governmental actors.  
 This article explores the theory and practice of competition advocacy, with the goal of 
                                                 
1 Engman, Lewis A., “Address” before the 1974 Fall Conference of the Financial Analysts Federation, 
October 7, 1974. (discussing regulatory excess and anticompetitive regulations; proposing vigorous antitrust 
enforcement as a substitute for regulation in certain industries.) 
 
2 One can argue that the Advocacy program (known internally as the “intervention” program in the 1970s 
and 1980s) dates back to the earliest days of the Commission, when the FTC submitted comments to the Fuel 
Administration (on coal pricing) and the War Industries Board (on steel).  For an analysis of the legal basis for the 
program based mainly on Section 6 of the FTC Act, see McChesney et al. (1982, pp. 2-7).  McChesney, Fred, Robert 
Rogowsky, et al. (1982) “Competition and Consumer Advocacy: Policy Review Session,” Federal Trade 
Commission, released June 9, (May 24, 1982 transmittal letter from Executive Director and Bureau Directors Bruce 
Yandle, Timothy Muris, Thomas Campbell, and Robert Tollison to the Commission) and Celnicker (1989, p. 382, 
note 21.)  Celnicker, Arnold  C. (1989) “The Federal Trade Commission’s Competition and Consumer Advocacy 
Program,” 33 St. Louis University Law Journal, 379-405. 
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explaining why the advocacy program should be recognized as a core element of the 
Commission’s mission.  Advocacy can be used in conjunction with many of the FTC’s other 
tools, and in many situations the judicious use of advocacy can provide a low-cost and effective 
alternative to other enforcement options.   The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  
Part II presents the theoretical basis for why advocacy provides a valuable tool for furthering the 
Commission’s competition and consumer protection missions.  Part III explores the history of 
competition advocacy activities at the FTC.  By examining the variation in advocacy activities, 
including the changes in internal Commission support, this Part of the article aims to draw 
historical lessons about the how the advocacy program can be best implemented to accomplish 
its goals.  Part IV explores some of these lessons and part V concludes. 
 
II. The Theory of Advocacy 
Although regulation sometimes is needed to correct a market failure, it also can be used 
to restrict competition in order to transfer wealth from consumers to a favored industry.  It has 
long been recognized that because of industry’s superior ability to organize political support 
relative to consumers, consumer interests often are subservient to industry interests in the 
regulatory process.3  Because it is too costly for consumers to organize, anticompetitive 
regulations are likely to go politically unopposed.  The Noerr-Pennington and state action 
doctrines, moreover, may accord antitrust immunity to attempts by industry to procure favorable 
regulation, as well as actions taken pursuant to such regulation if enacted.   
                                                 
3 As Peltzman has noted, “[a] common, though not universal, conclusion has become that, as 
between the two main contending interests in the regulatory processes, the producer interest tends to prevail over the 
consumer interest.” Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Economic Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 
212 (1976). 
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Just as the FTC uses enforcement to challenge anticompetitive conduct by private parties, 
its Congressionally-mandated mission also justifies challenging regulations that reduce 
consumer welfare by placing unwarranted restrictions on competition.   Indeed, because 
misdirected regulation can have just as pernicious effects on consumer welfare as the most 
egregious cases of price fixing, there does not appear to a reasoned justification for 
differentiating between privately and publicly created restraints on competition.4  As Chairman 
Miller’s staff concluded:   
[I]njury to consumers can arise from the actions of parties in both the private and public 
sectors.  Where consumer welfare is reduced by unwarranted regulatory restrictions 
imposed on the market by public agencies, fair and impartial efforts by the FTC to 
improve consumer welfare should actually lead it to challenge those restrictions. . . . 
[T]he Commission should allocate its resources to the areas where net consumer benefits 
are greatest, regardless whether the injuries arise from restrictions by private parties or 
public agencies.  Ultimately, the basic goals, methods of analysis, cost-benefit 
calculations guiding the decision to intervene, and general procedures for intervening 
follow clearly and logically from the existing competition and consumer protection 
missions already developed in the FTC.5  
 
A. The Economic Theory of Regulation and the Need for Advocacy 
 Regulatory intervention can be an appropriate response to a market failure.  Beginning 
with the seminal work of Stigler (and later more formally developed by Peltzman and Becker), 
however, the notion that regulation is produced in a black box to maximize social welfare has 
                                                 
4 As FTC Chairman Oliver noted in 1986: 
 
It is now convincingly argued that state and local governments create some of the most blatantly 
anticompetitive combinations to be found in the economy.  The anti-consumer results are evidenced by, for 
example, higher milk prices, and scarce and expensive taxi-cabs, in cites like New York.  States issue 
building codes that exclude competing products.  State licensing often creates cartels for doctors and 
morticians.  The list goes on. 
 
See address by Daniel Oliver, Chairman of the FTC, Antitrust Reform: Staying Alive? 5 (Nov. 15, 1986) 
5 Competition & Consumer Advocacy: Policy Review Session at 7-8 (May 24, 1982). 
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given way to what has become known as the economic theory of regulation (ETR).6  The 
foundation of ETR is that politicians and constituents are rational economic actors.  As such, 
constituents demand favorable regulation and politicians use the state’s coercive power to supply 
it in return for political support.  When adopting a policy, regulators7 weigh the political support 
from those who stand to gain against political opposition from those who stand to lose.  The 
interest group most able to translate their demand for a policy preference into political pressure 
is the one most likely to achieve their desired outcome.8    
Building on the work of scholars like Anthony Downs and Mancur Olson, ETR has 
recognized that information and organizational costs will limit the size of effective interest 
groups.9  As a threshold matter, individuals must expend resources to gain enough information to 
recognize their interests.  As Stigler notes, “[t]he costs of comprehensive information are higher 
in the political arena [than the marketplace] because information must be sought on so many 
issues of little or no direct concern to the individual, and accordingly he will know little about 
                                                 
6 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGM’T SCIENCE 
3 (1971); Peltzman, supra note __; Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups, 98 Q.J. ECON. 
371 (1983). 
7 In this paper “politician” and “regulator” are used interchangeably.   
8 An important insight from Peltzman, supra note __, was that regulation would never provide 
industry with the monopoly outcome because at very high levels of wealth transfer, marginal consumer opposition is 
likely to be greater than marginal industry support for the regulation.  ETR has received a vast amount of empirical 
support.  For example, several studies have shown a strong statistical relationship between campaign contributions 
and congressional voting.  See, e.g., James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Voting on Minimum Wages:  A Time Series 
Analyis, 86 J. POL. ECON. 337 (1978); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in 
Congressional Voting, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 365 (1979); Kau et al., A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional 
Voting,  97 Q.J. ECON.  271 (1982); Henry W. Chappell, Campaign Contributions and Voting on the Cargo 
Preference Bill:  A Comparison of Simultaneous Models, 36 PUBLIC CHOICE 301 (1981); Henry W. Chappell, 
Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model, 64 REV. ECON. & 
STATISTICS 77 (1982).   
9 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); MANCUR OLSON, THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).     
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most matters before the legislature.”10  Holding constant the size of a wealth transfer, the larger 
the interest group size, the smaller the per capita benefit; as per capita benefits diminish, the less 
likely it is that informing one’s self on the impact of a regulation makes economic sense.    
Second, once individuals recognize their interest in the outcome of the regulatory 
process, they must organize to translate their demand for policy into political pressure.  Because 
the benefits from acquiring a desired regulatory outcome is a public good for members of an 
interest group, however, each member has an incentive to shirk his obligation to the group and 
free-ride of the contributions of others.  
The important implication of this insight is that policies that reduce the welfare of a 
majority for the benefit of a minority are within the set of feasible outcomes.11  Indeed, one 
readily can see how consumer interests give way to the interests of a small industry in the 
regulatory process.  Beyond a certain point, per capita benefits from a preferred regulatory 
outcome are diluted such that it becomes irrational to take part in the political process.  A 
practical consequence of this is that small groups with similar interests – like members of a 
particular industry – can organize political support more effectively than large diffuse groups – 
like consumers generally.  Thus, the equilibrium outcome of the political process is likely to be 
regulation that harms consumers by protecting a favored industry from competition.  Take for 
example Stigler’s observation with regard to occupational licensing: 
If an occupation deals with the public at large, the costs which licensing imposes upon 
any one customer or industry will be small and it will not be economic for that customer 
                                                 
10 Stigler, supra note __, at 11.  
11 See Peltzman, supra note__, at 213 (“In consequence the numerically large, diffuse interest group 
is unlikely to be an effective bidder, and a policy inimical to the interest of a numerical majority will not be 
automatically rejected.”). 
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or industry to combat the drive for licensure. . . .  Thus, a small occupation employed by 
only one industry which has few employers will have difficulty in getting licensure; 
whereas a large occupation serving everyone will encounter no organized opposition.12   
These insights shape both the necessity for and nature of advocacy.  ETR suggests that it 
is useful to identify a public entity tasked with the responsibility of representing dispersed 
consumers and competition as an end in itself in the political process.  Concentrated interests can 
always hire lobbyists and experts to explain why their industry is “different” and thus should be 
exempt from the discipline of the market process.  A competition authority, expert in 
understanding the competitive process, can explain to the public and to generalist political actors 
whether these calls for industry-specific regulation will really further the public good.  Advocacy 
also can inform consumers of their interests in a regulation, perhaps spurring the desire to 
organize politically to oppose a regulation that will result in higher prices and less choice.  As 
the 1989 “Kirkpatrick Report” observes: 
The FTC's competition advocacy program permits it to accomplish for consumers what 
prohibitive costs prevent them from tackling individually.  It is the potential for the FTC 
to undo governmentally imposed restraints that lessen consumer welfare, and to prevent 
their imposition, that warrants the program's continuance and expansion.  Because 
ill-advised governmental restraints can impose staggering costs on consumers, the 
potential benefits from an advocacy program exceed the Commission's entire budget.13 
 The theory of political economy can also help to explain why it is uniquely appropriate to 
have a federal agency tasked with carrying out the advocacy function.  First, the FTC’s advocacy 
activities are often criticized as an improper “meddling” in the affairs of state governments.14  
                                                 
12 Stigler, supra note__, at 14.   
13 Report of the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Special Committee to Study 
the Role of Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report, Vol. 56, Bureau of National Affairs 
Special Supplement (April 6, 1989) at S-23. 
14 As will be discussed below, this criticism is fundamentally misplaced, as the Commission has followed a general 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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But if failures in local political markets are what drive FTC intervention, it is evident that this 
criticism misses the mark.  As noted by James Madison in Federalist 10, state and local 
governments are often the most prone to the sort of factions and interest-group activity that 
generates anticompetitive regulation.  Thus, a particular interest group may be especially 
concentrated or strong in a particular state, and that group may have undue influence in the 
political process of that state.  In addition, the anticompetitive regulations of one state may have 
major spillovers, or other externalities that impose burdens on national markets. 15  As a result, it 
is appropriate for the advocacy function to rest with a national actor that will be less prone to 
capture by parochial interest groups, but instead will be attenuated from some local political 
pressures and will be able to look out for the national goals of preserving robust economic 
market competition.16 
 It also is important to recognize that there are some inherent limits on the benefits that 
advocacy can provide.  For example, although advocacy provides regulators with information 
concerning the likely economic consequences of a policy choice, the FTC is not a constituent.  
FTC opposition to a protectionist piece of legislation, therefore, is not the same as constituent 
opposition because the FTC cannot provide political support in the form of votes or campaign 
                                                                                                                                                             
long-standing policy of filing advocacy filings with state officials only where public comments are invited or when 
expressly invited by an appropriate state official. 
15 These spillovers may occur in many different ways.  For instance, restrictions on the ability of in-state consumers 
to receive direct shipment of wine from out-of-state wineries has been called “the single greatest barrier to e-
commerce in wine.”  See Wine Report.  In addition, so-called “sales below cost” laws prohibit the sale of gasoline 
below certain minimum prices and have the likely effect of chilling aggressive competition and likely raising prices 
to consumers.  By affecting out-of-state consumers who purchase gas in states with such restrictions, the impact of 
the anticompetitive law is felt in interstate commerce. 
16 In addition, the FTC’s status as a bipartisan independent agency may also increase its effectiveness on advocacy 
issues.  Because critics often will characterize FTC interventions as “taking sides,” the Commission’s status as a 
bipartisan expert agency may insulate it from some of the attacks that might otherwise be leveled at its advocacy 
activities. 
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contributions.17  In addition, FTC advocacy can only inform the debate and suggest appropriate 
action; it cannot compel that action.  What’s more, the FTC is itself a regulatory body and may 
be subject to political pressure from interest groups in much the same manner as state agencies 
or legislatures.  For instance, some studies have found a relationship between the preferences of 
congressional oversight members’ constituencies and FTC policy.18 
B. Immunities 
A second theoretical justification for the FTC’s advocacy capability flows directly from 
the agency’s duty to enforce the antitrust laws.  Because of several statutory and nonstatutory 
exemptions from the antitrust laws, much activity with an anticompetitive effect is exempt from 
the review of the antitrust laws.  This includes the broad, judicially-created state action19 and 
Noerr-Pennington doctrines,20 as well as more narrow statutory exemptions.  In general, these 
exemptions are welfare-reducing, in that they allow narrow interests to seek rents by imposing 
restraints on competition.  
                                                 
17 However, to extent that analysis exposing regulation as harming consumers is publicized, it may increase 
political costs of such regulation by informing consumers of their stake in the regulatory outcome. 
18 Weingast and Moran, for example, provide some empirical evidence that FTC enforcement priorities – as 
measured by Robinson-Patman, textiles, and credit caseloads --  tracks the preferences of the Congressional 
committees that oversee the FTC.  Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional 
Control?  Regulatory Policy Making at the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).  Similarly, 
Faith et al., find that the FTC is statistically significantly less likely to challenge a merger that involves the district of 
an FTC oversight committee member.  Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J. LAW & ECON. 329 (1982).  Future 
Chairman Muris – then head of BCP –  responded to Weingast and Moran’s paper.  He conceded that “Congress can, 
and often does, exert considerable influence over an agency such as the FTC.”  Muris, however, expressed 
skepticism that the evidence was sufficient to prove that point.  In particular, he noted the authors’ failure to consider 
forces other than Congress – such as staff, the courts and the White House – that also shape FTC policy.    Timothy 
J. Muris, Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission:  The Extent of Congressional Control, 94 J. 
POL. ECON. 884 (1986).   
19 See Report of the State Action Task Force. 
20 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 
U.S. 657 (1965). 
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The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is grounded in the First Amendment right to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.  In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr,21 
and later in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,22 the Supreme Court held that attempts to lobby 
government for even anticompetitive regulation was immune from antitrust challenge.  In 
subsequent cases, such immunity was accorded to other types of government petitioning, 
including proceedings before administrative agencies and courts.23   In Parker v. Brown, the 
Supreme Court first articulated what has become know as the state action doctrine, which shields 
certain anticompetitive conduct from federal antitrust scrutiny when the conduct is (1) in 
furtherance of a clearly articulated state policy, and (2) actively supervised by the state.24   
If a statutory or nonstatutory exemption is triggered, the application of the exemption 
shields the conduct from the reach of the antitrust laws.  Once an anticompetitive activity goes 
behind the exemption wall, the competition authority is largely powerless to deal with its 
negative effects on competition and consumers.  At that point, the only controlling authority is 
that which granted the exemption in the first place.  For instance, if a state bar is authorized to 
regulate the practice of law within a state, as long as the restriction is properly imposed and 
executed, consumers’ only recourse is to appeal to the very body that imposed the 
anticompetitive restraint.  The FTC cannot intervene unless the bar’s regulation either goes 
                                                 
21 365 U.S. 127 (1961).  
22 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
23 CITE.  
24   317 U.S. 341 (1943).  See the Report of the State Action Task Force for a discussion of the problems that have 
arisen with respect to over broad application of the state action doctrine to immunize anticompetitive actions.   
Similar to the state action doctrine, federal legislation that conflicts with federal antitrust laws is said to enact an 
“implied repeal” of the antitrust laws.  See Gordon  v.  New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art6
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beyond what is clearly articulated and actively supervised by the state, and then can do so only 
through expensive and time-consuming litigation with a high burden of proof.25 
This impotence in the face of the operation of antitrust exemptions provides the second 
rationale for a vigorous competition advocacy program.  Advocacy can prevent or modify 
anticompetitive restraints before they are imposed, thereby avoiding the harm and avoiding the 
costly and uncertain effort to later challenge the restraint.  Once a regulation is imposed that 
generates economic rents for interested parties, they will be willing to invest to prevent the 
repeal of the regulation, and the vagaries of the American system of bicameralism and 
presentment make it more difficult to repeal previously-enacted legislation than to enact new 
legislation.26  Alternatively, the competition authority can try to sue in the narrow set of 
circumstances where the regulation falls outside the protected scope of activity.  In general, 
however, courts have applied exemptions to the antitrust laws in an unduly expansive manner, 
thereby limiting the effectiveness of this course of action.27  Moreover, litigation is inherently 
expensive and often effectively limits the possibility of compromise.   
The effective use of advocacy can be seen as an effort to balance the goals of the antitrust 
laws with those protected by the exemptions, rather than being an all or nothing grant of 
authority to engage in anticompetitive activity.  Moreover, ex ante advocacy is much less 
expensive than ex post litigation and allows for the possibility of compromise and tailoring of the 
                                                 
25 See Report of the State Action Task Force; California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 
U.S. 97 (1980).  
26 Cite McChesney, Money for Nothing. 
27 Further a special interest that is powerful enough to capture a regulatory board and impose an anticompetitive 
restraint may also be powerful enough to capture the legislature that imposes the restraint, thereby acquiring express 
authorization for the regulation that is later imposed. 
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regulation to ameliorate the unintended consequences of the regulation.  Advocacy to prevent the 
imposition of welfare-reducing exemptions to the antitrust laws is especially appropriate with 
respect to exemptions that flow directly from the operation of the political process, such as the 
state action doctrine and Noerr.   
 
III. History of Advocacy 
 Despite its value in protecting consumer interests – the core mission of the FTC – the 
fortunes of the advocacy program have waxed and waned over time.  Although imperfect, the 
number of annual advocacy filings (shown in Figure 1) provides a rough proxy for the vigor of 
the advocacy program over time. 
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 From 1980 to 2003, the 24 years for which reasonably comparable data exist, about 667 
comments were issued, an average of 28 per year.  As readily seen in Figure 1, however, this 
average masks substantial swings in the Commission’s use of advocacy over the years.   The 
advocacy program focused on competition, consumer protection, and regulatory fronts over the 
years, changing some with the public policy issues of the day.28  Several topic areas survived 
over fairly long periods of time.  These hardy perennials and the years when they were most 
active included: restraints on international trade (1975-1990), restraints on health care 
advertising and commercial practices (1978-1994), horizontal restraints and erection of entry 
barriers via legislation (1980-2003), regulation issues in airline, rail, and truck transportation 
(1980-1993), comments regarding regulatory reform in telecommunications, broadcasting, and 
cable TV (1983-1995), regulation of food claims in advertising and labeling (1987-1993, 2000, 
2003), and, most recently, restructuring of the electricity generation, transmission, and 
distribution industry (1995-2003).  Several filings concerning various postal regulation issues 
appeared between 1981 and 1989.29  Certain other narrow topic areas would survive only a year 
or so.30 
                                                 
28 A list of post-1994 advocacy filings may be found on the FTC Web site at  www.ftc.gov/be/advofile.htm.   
Lists and descriptions of these and earlier filings can be found at the back of the FTC's Annual Reports, at least 
through 2000.  Although amicus briefs are not often counted in the advocacy compilations, much of the analysis 
presented in this paper is applicable to an amicus filing program because it is similar to other advocacy activity in 
many ways. 
 
29 See comments on U.S. Postal System entry into the electronic mail business in 1983, and Postal 
Rate Commission evidence issues in the later 1980s regarding Express Mail.  The last of the filings was warmly 
praised by the PRC Commissioner Crutcher, who invited further FTC participation.  (Hilke memo to Daniel and 
Pautler, March 21, 1990.) 
30 For example, in 1993, and later in 2004, there were many comments about "any willing provider" 
laws, as pharmacy groups and others were lobbying state legislatures for protection against the anticipated effects of 
health care reforms.  Most of these health care-related comments have been requested by and issued to state and 
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 A. Periods of Differing Emphasis on Advocacy 
 1.  1970s and Beginning of Modern Era 
 One can argue that the Advocacy program (known internally as the “intervention” 
program in the 1970s and 1980s) dates back to the earliest days of the Commission, when the 
FTC submitted comments to the Fuel Administration (on coal pricing) and the War Industries 
Board (on steel).  But if we do not want to ascribe the origins of a program to distant and 
idiosyncratic events, a better date for the beginning of the program might be October 7, 1974 
when Chairman Louis Engman spoke about the broader use of antitrust policy as an alternative 
to the regulation of markets.  When referring to the nation’s macroeconomic problems – in 1974 
the U.S. economy was suffering from stagflation -- he argued that burdensome federal 
transportation regulations contributed to the problem of slow economic growth and that an 
aggressive antitrust enforcement could be a substitute for regulation of certain industries.  
Because it presented competition policy as a novel alternative to deal with pressing economic 
problems, the speech received substantial coverage in the press – including a front page story in 
the New York Times.31 
Regardless of the precise starting point for the program, a competition-based advocacy 
program was in full swing by June 1980 when Alfred Dougherty, Bureau of Competition 
                                                                                                                                                             
local legislatures and other government bodies.  In 1987, the FTC staff filed over a dozen comments with states 
regarding potentially anticompetitive aspects of attorney ethics codes. 
31 This timing for the start of the program would be generally consistent with Scherer’s argument that the 
regulatory intervention program had its origins as the result of several 1970s economic reports documenting the costs 
imposed by clumsy government policies (e.g., petroleum pricing, optician regulation, and occupational licensing).  
Scherer, F. M. (1990) “Sunlight and Sunset at the Federal Trade Commission,” Administrative Law Review, Vol. 
142, Fall, 461-487.  Kovacic (1982, p. 649) discusses the mid-1970s activity in competition advocacy.  Kovacic, 
William E. (1982) “The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement,” Tulsa 
Law Journal, Vol. 17, 587-671. 
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Director under Chairman Pertschuk, wrote that "the intervention program played an important 
role in advancing the Commission's competition goals."32  Under Pertschuk, the Commission or 
its staff presented comments to numerous federal level agencies33 on a wide range of issues, 
including international trade,34 health professions, and transportation.35 
 2.  The Buildup Under Miller and Continuation in the 1980s 
Chairman James Miller further emphasized and formalized the advocacy program by 
providing a public rationale and plan for the program and placing coordination of the program in 
the Bureau of Consumer Protection.36   
As Figure 1 indicates, at least in numbers of filings, the program grew significantly from 
1982 through 1987, when the program reached its apex with 90 comments.37   The number of 
filings increased during this period for a least three reasons: (1) there was a greater emphasis on 
the program generally and thus more opportunities were pursued, (2) there was an increase in the 
                                                 
32 Celnicker (1989, p. 384) citing Alfred F. Dougherty Jr. memorandum to the Commission, June 30, 1980.  
Celnicker (1989) provides a history and evaluation of the Advocacy program.   
 
33 From 1977 to 1982 comments would have been filed with almost every alphabet agency of the federal 
government including the CAB, ICC (both now defunct), DOE, DHEW (now DHHS), FCC, ITC, and USDA.  
McChesney et al. (1982, Appendix) provides a listing of 327 advocacy-like products produced between 1977 and 
1982.  The count includes many items that might not be counted today (e.g., speeches, testimony, reports); but 
regardless of what one counts, the list is impressively long. 
34 There were many filings with the International Trade Commission from 1975 to 1982; see McChesney et al. 
(1982, pp. 38-42, A27-A28).  Such filings were a staple of the 1970s and 1980s advocacy program with about 51 
individual filings (in dozens of product categories) from 1982 to 1989.  Three such filings occurred in 1990 and one 
final outlier filing was done in September 1994. 
35 FTC Annual Report 1979, pp. 7-9. 
36 See McChesney, et al. (1982) and Tollison (1983, pp. 217-18).  Tollison, Robert D. (1983) “Antitrust in the 
Reagan Administration: A Report from the Belly of the Beast,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 1, 
211-221.  The program was to be based on longer term empirical research that would be the foundation for multiple 
comments, and procedures were set up to allow 1 week turnaround for comments.  
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variety of the issues covered (e.g., postal practices and taxicab regulation), and (3) there were 
certain policy issues that were playing out in many states simultaneously, resulting in a large 
number of advocacy opportunities on a single issue (e.g., attorney ethics codes, professional 
advertising, gasoline marketing, retail dealer protections, optometry retailing, etc.).   
The program under Miller also included a somewhat sharper focus on governmentally 
imposed barriers and a new-found emphasis on state-level activity in addition to federal level 
activity that had previously been the mainstay of the program.38  The program was further 
bolstered by complementary Bureau of Economics research on restraints involving 
transportation, telecommunications, healthcare, licensure, and international trade.  
 3. Storm Clouds and Deemphasis of Advocacy in the 1990s 
The advocacy program was controversial from its inception because it could not avoid 
offending someone on each issue it pursued.  Some of the animus toward the program was likely 
based on disputes over specific policy suggestions, while more general objections may have 
arisen regarding the proper role (if any) of a federal Agency in providing suggestions regarding 
competition or regulatory policies to a state legislature or regulatory body.39  Additionally, 
certain Congressional critics also argued that the advocacy program was sufficiently resource 
                                                                                                                                                             
37  From 1983-1989, 56 comments were filed in an average year.   
38 The ratio of state to federal filings rose steadily from 1982 to a peak in 1988, when state filings outnumbered 
federal filings by 4 to 1.  Thereafter, except for the outlier year of 1993, relative state level activity fell to a level 
roughly equal to federal activity.   
39 Staff comments generally are not sent to a state agency or legislature without a specific request for comments by 
an appropriate governmental official.   
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intensive that it kept the Commission from aggressively pursuing predation and other nonmerger 
antitrust activities.40   
In an effort to reduce tensions between the FTC and other state and federal regulators, 
Chairman Janet Steiger began to de-emphasized the advocacy program in 1989, as Figure 1 
clearly shows.41  The average number of annual filings from 1990 to 2001 was 17, a marked 
decrease from the 1980s.  As part of the winding down, various categories of filings were 
avoided altogether; comments to the Postal Service and most comments on international trade 
issues ended in 1990.42  In addition, state-level advocacy activity waned as the regional offices 
(who traditionally had been a source of leads on state-level issues) moved out of their advocacy 
                                                 
40 But, as Celnicker notes, FTC leadership purposely had chosen to avoid enforcement in these areas because 
they were likely to be welfare-reducing; the resources that the Advocacy program consumed were never sufficient to 
constrain the Commission from pursuing other activities.  Celnicker (1989, p. 399).  Advocacy consumed about 3 to 
4% of FTC staff resources (30 to 40 workyears) at the 1987 zenith (See James Giffin, Associate Executive Director, 
memorandum to Andrew J. Strenio (FTC Commissioner), July 28, 1987 cited by Celnicker (1989, p. 399)).  
Advocacy resources were about 2% of FTC resources in 1989 and by 1994 they had fallen to less than ½% of FTC 
resources (4 to 5 agency workyears).  By 2000, the percentage was so small that the program was virtually invisible - 
a maximum guesstimate regarding agency-wide advocacy resources would have been two workyears.  (The data for 
that year, such as they are, indicate that less than one workyear was devoted to advocacy across the agency).  As of 
2002, the total agency workyears devoted to advocacy might have been closer to five. 
41 Chairman Steiger’s term covered late 1989 to mid-1995.  One of her major goals was to improve 
relationships with various state agencies.  De-emphasizing the advocacy program was one means of achieving that 
goal. (For a discussion of Chairman Steiger’s goal of federal/state cooperation, see “Cutler Hangs up FTC Armor 
Again,” Food & Drink Daily, May 1993, p. 2 and Cutler’s paper in the NAAG Consumer Protection Report, 
February 1991, pp. 1-3.)  Fairly early in Chairman Steiger’s tenure, the regional offices, which handled a good bit of 
the advocacy generation and production work at the state level, reduced their effort in advocacy work.  The early 
phase of the decline in advocacy from 1989 to 1990 resulted in the reduction in both advocacy filings (49%) and 
resources used in the program (20%) over that period.  The decline continued throughout the 1990s.  From 1991 to 
1994 few resources were allocated to the effort by the two legal bureaus and the regional offices, although the 
residual momentum of the program resulted in a continuing stream of filings.  This is not to say that advocacy 
disappeared.  Indeed, several substantial federal filings were done to the FCC and FDA, many based on earlier work 
done in the regulatory studies program. 
 
42 Steiger had previously been the chairman of the Postal Rate Commission that was charged with overseeing 
the actions of the U.S. Postal Service. 
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generation role.43  Further, after 1995, advocacy positions were much more closely coordinated 
with other government agencies (e.g., DOJ, FCC, FERC, DOT) to ensure consistency of 
viewpoint and a generalized executive department consistency.44   
By early 2000, the FTC's program of regulatory comment was small and mostly uni-
dimensional, focusing very heavily on the restructuring of the electricity generation and 
distribution industry.  The program produced scattered comments on other substantive issues 
(e.g., comments to FDA on food advertising or drug regulation issues, or state-based horizontal 
entry restraints), but they were few compared to the heyday of advocacy activity and virtually 
none were supported by empirical work because by that time the agency did little research on 
regulatory issues.45 
                                                 
43  In addition to an effort to reduce conflict, another reason for dwindling advocacy activity in the 1990s may 
have been a reduction in the number of important, but easy targets.  In the late 1970s and 1980, regulation of several 
inherently competitive industries made easy targets of many transportation industries for advocacy efforts.  By the 
mid-1990s, however, most of those targets were gone, as regulation of transportation, certain utilities, 
telecommunications regulation had been eliminated or altered significantly.  Thus, there may have been somewhat 
less need for an advocate for rational analysis of federal regulatory and competition issues than there was in the 
1970s and 1980s.  One additional factor that might explain the lack of emphasis on advocacy activity in the late-
1990s is the merger wave of that era.  Although the advocacy program itself required a relatively small resource 
commitment, the efforts of the Commission to deal with the merger wave may have had an indirect effect on the 
advocacy program.  The need to deal with the large number of mergers may have drawn off BE resources from the 
primary research necessary to generate effective advocacies, as well as taxing the small staffs of the individual 
Commissioners.  Thus, there are various chokepoints in the advocacy production pipeline which can be affected by a 
resource constraint that it not captured in the pure FTE numbers.  
 
44 It is interesting that the original conception of the formal advocacy program indicated that if the comments 
were redundant with those of other agencies, the program would be less valuable.  See McChesney et al. (1982, p. 
13).  In a broader context, coordination with the Department of Justice on advocacy and competition policy fronts 
increased continually over the 1990s and 2000s.  This enhanced coordination occurred on both international and 
domestic competition policy. 
45 The electricity work was not based on research done at the FTC.  Substantive empirical work on those 
issues is done by the state regulators, private parties, and academics.  The FTC did, however, hold a conference on 
electricity regulation in the Summer of 1997 and compiled a report on state retail electricity regulation in 2001.  The 
large number of state-specific electricity filings in fiscal 1998 (17 filings) accounted for the bump-up in filings that 
year.   Some of the decline in advocacy activity in the late-1990s may have been due to the merger wave of that era.  
Although the advocacy program itself has always drawn minimal resources, the efforts of the Commission to deal 
with the merger wave may have had an indirect effect on the advocacy program.  It is possible that the need to deal 
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 4. Renewed Interest in the Advocacy Program under Muris 
With the Muris Chairmanship came a renewed emphasis on the FTC’s advocacy 
program.  There were 20 filings in 2002, a level that has held fairly constant since.  Further, the 
program sought to expand beyond electricity into areas that were familiar ground in the 1980s - 
restraints on entry in local markets and governmental restrictions on competition.  Although the 
general regulatory research that used to support the program in the 1980s was not in existence, 
the topics of comment became more diverse.  For example, comments on such topics as the retail 
marketing of gasoline, wine distribution, licensure, and the unauthorized practice of law became 
commonplace. 
B. Assessment of the Advocacy Program 
Overall, it appears that the Advocacy Program has proven successful, especially in light 
of its modest budget requirements.  Two studies have attempted to provide a general assessment 
of the Advocacy Program's impact.   A 1989 Law Review46 article conducted a survey of state 
and local parties that received FTC Advocacy comments dated June 1, 1985 through June 1, 
1987.  Based on the survey responses, the author concluded that  
the FTC provided input that decisionmakers found useful. [I]n only twenty-five percent 
of the cases did the decisionmakers find the information or perspectives provided by the 
comment duplicative of other comments, or information already well understood by the 
decisionmaker. . . .  Sixty-five percent of the survey recipients indicated that they either 
had requested, or plan to request, FTC input on other issues . . . These survey results lead 
to the conclusion that the FTC comments were of value to the decisionmaking process. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
with the large number of mergers may have drawn off BE resources from the primary research necessary to generate 
effective advocacies, as well as taxing the small staffs of the respective Commissioners.  Thus, there are various 
chokepoints in the advocacy production pipeline which can be affected by a severe resource constraint that it not 
captured in the pure FTE numbers.  
46 Celnicker (1989, pp. 400-401). 
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In 1989, a virtually identical survey was sent by the Director of the FTC's Advocacy Office to 
recipients of comments dated June 1, 1987 through June 2, 1989.  The responses to this second 
survey were consistent with those from the first.47 
Certain advocacy comments almost surely had some effect on final outcomes.48  A few 
leading examples include: (1) a comment on an Illinois PPO bill that would have allowed 
physicians to collectively determine their fees,49 (2) comments to the FCC regarding the relative 
merits of price cap regulation versus rate of return regulation in 1987 provided the basis for the 
FCC action,50 (3) the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration based its 1986 and 
l988 decisions not to raise its automobile fuel efficiency standard on an analyses provided by 
FTC staff,51 (4) the testimony in early 1989 on certificate of need legislation in North Carolina 
was said to have played a key role in the Policy Board recommendation against continuing the 
entry restraints,52 (5) a November 1991 comment to the FAA regarding “use or lose” rules for 
                                                 
47 Most advocacy comments are reportedly helpful and welcome and many of the comments have a 
significant influence on decision makers.  As noted earlier, the ABA’s Kirkpatrick Commission also favorably 
commented on the FTC’s advocacy program in 1989.  
48 It is very difficult to know whether any particular study or advocacy filing actually affected a 
decision.  Even when decision-makers later indicate that they relied on particular evidence or arguments, one can 
never be sure that such statements are not just after-the-fact justifications.  Having made this disclaimer, we note a 
few advocacy filings that appeared to have an impact. 
49  See the June 11, 1986 comment by the CHRO (Bill MacLeod & Tamara Kempf)).  According to a 
local newspaper, the FTC comment criticizing the bill was a development critical to the defeat of the bill. See James 
M. Giffin to FTC, Report on Successful Competition Advocacy Efforts, January 21, 1987, p. 2, (recounting six 
successes during the previous year.) 
50 The Chairman of the FCC, Dennis Patrick, cited these results as the basis of the FCC policy 
choice.  See letter from Patrick to U.S. Representative John Dingell, January 25, 1988. 
51 See Robert P. Rogers, Comments of the FTC Staff to the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, March 24, l986. 
52 Letter from Hamilton C. Horton Jr., Vice Chairperson, North Carolina State Goals and Policy Board, Department 
of Administration to Keith B. Anderson, March 20, 1989. 
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airport landing slots convinced the FAA to alter its rule,53 (6) empirical work showed that rules 
proposed by FDA would disallow health claims for large classes of arguably healthy food, such 
as fish and lean meats.  As a result of the work, FDA altered the rules such that better versions of 
“bad” foods would be able to tout their superior characteristics,54 and (7) an attorney for an 
advertisers trade association indicated (three years after-the-fact) that the FTC staff filing to 
FDA on direct-to-consumer drug advertising in early 1996 “turned the tide” toward allowing 
information to flow to consumers regarding drug therapy options.55   
More recently, FTC efforts to highlight the competition issues in electricity industry 
restructuring had an impact as one leading researcher in the area cited the FTC’s arguments to 
make the point that open access to transmission grids would only work if sellers truly trusted the 
independence of the grid operator.56    Similarly, in the CFTC’s approval of the application of 
United States Futures Exchange to open a futures trading market in the United States, one CFTC 
                                                 
53 On November 15, 1991 the FTC staff (Bruce Kobayashi) filed a comment with the Federal 
Aviation Administration, which was considering revisions to the rules governing the sale and transfer of the right to 
take-off or land at one of the four high density airports.  On August 18, 1992, the FAA published its Final Rule 
increasing the "use-or-lose" usage rate from 65% to 80% on a weekly basis.  In explaining its decision to adopt an 
80% “use or lose” rule, the FAA cited prominently to the FTC staff comment, which reported that slot usage by the 
major slot-holders already exceeded 90%. 
54 See the FTC staff comment (Ippolito and Murphy) to FDA, February 25, 1992; and DHHS: FDA 
Food Labeling: General Requirements for Health Claims for Foods. Fed. Reg. vol 58 (3), January 1993, 2478, esp. p. 
2493. 
55 Staff filing (Jan Pappalardo) to FDA on direct-to-consumer drug promotion V960001 January, 
1996 (personal communication 6-00). 
56 Statement by Bill Hogan, Public Utilities Fortnightly, July 1, 1999, pp. 19-20.  In addition, one FERC 
Commissioner used FTC staff advocacy comments as a principal basis for his speech material. See FERC 
Commissioner William Massey’s 1998 speech on Independent System Operators for electricity transmission. 
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Commissioner also expressly referred to the analysis of the FTC in assisting in his decision to 
approve the application.57 
Despite some notable successes, in policy areas where income distribution factors take 
precedence and consumer protection rationales are not important, FTC comment is unlikely to be 
influential.  One area where this was clearly true was restraints on international trade.  In most 
debates on trade restraints, competition and consumer welfare play little or no role.58  The 
Commission staff had undertaken extensive investigations of trade restraints issues from the 
mid-1970s through the early 1990s.  Many of the filings contained new empirical and conceptual 
work.59  Two decades of work, however, did not observably alter policy or individual decisions.  
The trade-related advocacies had offended many politicians (and some ITC commissioners) over 
the years.  Opponents of the FTC's advocacy efforts in this area went so far as to argue that the 
FTC’s advocacy program, which focused on consumer welfare effects of trade restraints, had 
advocated violations of the law by the ITC because it drew the ITC’s attention toward consumer 
welfare (which the trade laws did not allow them to consider) and away from the distress of the 
trade-impacted industries and workers.    
                                                 
57 Statement  of CFTC Commissioner Lukken, February 4, 2004, 
www.cftc.gov/opa/press04/opausferemarks.htm. 
58 The FTC had always focused it main trade advocacy efforts on cases at the ITC that allowed a somewhat 
broader view of the effects of trade restraints - section 337 (unfair competition) and section 201 (escape clause) 
cases.  Many trade restraints take the form of anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases (sections 701 and 731), 
where the ITC is less able to consider the broad effects of their actions. 
59 There were many filings with the International Trade Commission from 1975 to 1982; see McChesney et al. 
(1982, pp. 38-42, A27-A28).  See, for example, D. Tarr before the International Trade Commission on Stainless 
Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, No. TA-203-16, Prehearing Brief of the FTC, March 27, 1987.  This was one of a long 
line of advocacy filings focusing on international trade restraints on products ranging from softwood lumber to 
DRAM computer chips.  Almost all empirical FTC staff analyses of trade restraints found that the benefits obtained 
from trade restraints (in terms of jobs “saved”, if indeed any jobs were saved in long-run equilibrium) were 
overwhelmed by the costs to consumers.  But those benefits were very specific to the workers and industries, and the 
costs were widely dispersed, so trade restraints remain popular despite their negative net impact. 
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IV. Integrating Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy 
This understanding of the theory and practice of competition advocacy suggests some 
lessons that can inform the future of the program.  First, advocacy can be a powerful and low 
cost way for the FTC to perform its mission of protecting consumers and competition.  It closely 
complements the FTC’s other capabilities, such as litigation and studies.  It thus should be 
recognized as one of the prime tools in the FTC’s arsenal, and one that should be supported 
notwithstanding the fact that it will often generate controversy. 
Second, the most successful of the advocacy filings seemed to be those that contained a 
substantial empirical component.60  Thoughtful empirical work, however, takes too long to allow 
it to be produced solely for an advocacy (where the lead-time is normally from two weeks to 
three months).  Thus, important issues need to be identified and empirical work done before an 
advocacy opportunity emerges.61  
                                                 
60 Comments containing original empirical research on specific regulatory issues were filed with many agencies 
including the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Transportation, and the Food and Drug 
Administration.   These filings tended to be the most convincing work of the program, because the empirical work 
made the filings more valuable and more credible than they might otherwise be.  See, e.g.,  Woodbury and Anderson 
on the Federal Communications Commission's AM/FM Radio and Television Ownership Rules, July 15, 1987; Ogur 
on Massport's (Boston’s airport authority) Program for Airport Capacity Efficiency, February 29, 1988; and Rogers 
and Woodbury on the FCC's Rules Concerning FM Translator stations, MM Docket 88-140, January 23, 1989; 
Kobayashi on the FCC’s financial interest and syndication rule which restricted ownership of the rights to re-run TV 
shows, 3 filings in 1990-1991; Vita on the FCC’s Must-Carry Rules for network TV (requiring carriage of local 
broadcast signals by cable systems), November 26, 1991; Kobayashi and Schumann on Federal Aviation 
Administration regulation of take-off and landing slots at certain airports, November 15, 1991, and November 23, 
1994; Ippolito and Murphy on the effects of the Food & Drug Administration’s regulation of health claims for food 
labeling and food identity standards, January 8, 1990; and February 25, 1992; and Vita on Rhode Island’s any-
willing-provider legislation, April 2004. 
61 For instance, empirical work done by a BE economist and the Commission’s report on competition in the health 
care industry has complemented advocacy filings on “any willing provider” laws involving retail pharmaceutical 
sales in Rhode Island and California legislation that would impose disclosure requirements on pharmacy benefits 
managers. See Michael G. Vita, Regulatory Restrictions on Selective Contracting:  An Empirical Analysis of Any 
Willing Provider Regulations, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 955 (2001); IMPROVING HEALTH CARE:  A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION, FTC & DOJ Staff Report (July 2004), available at 
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 Third, investments in advocacy in one state will often reap benefits in others.   As a 
result, one FTC comment often will spawn further invitations to comment in other states as ideas 
for protectionist legislation spreads from one state to another.  Because the fixed cost in 
analyzing the restraint has already been incurred, each of these subsequent filings are quite 
inexpensive.  For instance, the frequency of legislation involving below-cost sales in gasoline 
retailing, or attempts by state bars to monopolize real estate settlement services has made initial 
investments in advocacy in these fields quite productive.    
 Fourth, casual empiricism suggests that comments to federal regulators – especially 
independent agencies – have met with a greater degree of success than similar comments to state 
regulators.62  This finding is consistent with two aspects of the theory underpinning competition 
advocacy.  First, although decision makers at federal agencies face Congressional oversight and 
White House pressure, they are more likely to be insulated from direct political pressure than 
state legislators or regulators.  This condition is likely to create “slack” between politicians’ 
constituencies’ interests and the policy adopted by federal regulators.63  Advocacy can be 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf; letter from Susan Creighton, Director of the Bureau 
of Competition et al. to Att’y Gen. Patrick Lynch (Apr. 8, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/04/ribills.pdf; letter from Susan Creighton, Director of the Bureau of Competition et al. 
to Rep. Greg Aghazarian (Sep. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040027.pdf.  The staff report on 
barriers to online sales of wine also proved useful in an advocacy filing concerning legislation that would allow 
direct shipment of wine in New York.   See letter from Susan Creighton, Director of the Bureau of Competition et al. 
to Assemblyman William Magee et al. (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v040012.pdf.  
62 See pages 19-22 and accompany notes, supra, noting successes with FERC, CFTC, FCC, FAA, FDA, and 
NHTSA. 
63 See e.g., Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan 1990. The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for 
Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions.  Journal of Law and Economics 33 (April): 103-131; Thomas H. 
Hammond & Jack H. Knott. 1996. Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, 
Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy  in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy Making.  
Journal of Law Economics & Organization 12 (April): 119-66; Thomas H. Hammond & Gary J. Miller. 1987. The 
Core of the Constitution.  American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1155-74. 
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effective in this “slack” area.   Second, that federal rather than state regulators may be more 
insulated from political forces is consistent with James Madison’s observation in Federalist 10.    
Finally, it appears that the Commission’s views may be most appreciated in situations 
where the regulation in question is facially related to the accomplishment of some consumer 
protection or competition goal.  The Commission’s dual expertise in competition and consumer 
protection will often enable it to speak with great force and credibility on those issues.  On such 
matters as occupational licensing, for instance, the FTC has over time developed great expertise 
on the interrelationship of competition and consumer protection goals.  Similarly, on new issues, 
such as state regulatory barriers to e-commerce, the FTC has developed expertise in such diverse 
fields as contact lenses, caskets, and direct shipment of wine, and can speak authoritatively to the 
issues of competition and consumer protection in those emerging industries.  In these areas, the 
FTC’s input can be especially valuable in debunking consumer protection rationales for 
anticompetitive regulations. 
V. Conclusion 
 The Federal Trade Commission is charged by Congress with protecting competition and 
consumer welfare.  It is important to recognize that the advocacy program is a unique and cost-
effective tool for carrying out this mission.  Because consumers are disadvantaged in the 
political arena vis-a-vis industry, they are likely to be unable to stop anticompetitive regulation 
on their own.  Antitrust immunities, moreover, sometimes put anticompetitive regulation beyond 
the reach of traditional enforcement.  By providing a means for the FTC to represent consumers’ 
interests directly in the policy-production mechanism, the advocacy program can overcome these 
two hurdles and provide protection for consumers at relatively low cost. 
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